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The last thirty-five years have brought a myriad of changes to
the law of res judicata. Res judicata literally means "a thing decided."' The doctrine rests on the premise that once a controversy
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1 . The term res judicata has been used by the courts to mean two different things. Sometimes the courts use the term to describe any situation in which
a party is foreclosed from litigating something later because of something that
happened in earlier litigation. Used in this generic way, res judicata is an umbrella term that covers the whole area. The second, more technical meaning of
res judicata is applicable only when a party is attempting to relitigate his whole

753

Heinonline - - 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 753 2003-2004

754

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 34

has been decided, that determination should be conclusive in a
subsequent a ~ t i o n .While
~
claim preclusion3 attempts to avoid duplication of whole claims or cases, issue preclusion or collateral
estoppel4 works to avoid duplication of particular issues. In effect,
the doctrine of issue preclusion scans the first litigation and takes
note of each issue decided in it. Then, if a second lawsuit based on
a different cause of action attempts to reintroduce the same issue,
issue preclusion intervenes to preclude relitigation of that issue and
bind parties to the result originally achieved.
The doctrine of issue preclusion has undergone significant developments in recent years.5 In the context of federal civil litigaclaim or cause of action; thus res judicata would apply not only to foreclose
rehearing matters that have been litigated earlier, but also to prevent litigation of
matters that might have been litigated in the earlier action. In this technical
sense, res judicata means "claim preclusion." See generally 18 JAMESWM.
MOOREET AL., MOORE'SFEDERAL
PRACTICE131, 132 (3d ed. 1998); Rivet v.
Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 476 (1998) (defining res judicata). For the
purposes of this article, I will use res judicata in its broad, umbrella sense to
include both claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
(SECOND)OF JUDGMENTS
5 27 (1982).
2. RESTATEMENT
3. Claim preclusion is one subset of res judicata. Claim preclusion is
asserted by a party in the second action who claims that the other party cannot
bring the lawsuit because the claim was already litigated in the first action. The
party asserting claim preclusion can argue that the other party either lost in the
first lawsuit and is therefore barred from bringing the claim, or the other party
won in the prior lawsuit and therefore the claim merged in the first judgment.
See generally Victoria L. Hooper, Avoiding the Trap of Res Judicata: A Practitioner's Guide to Litigating Multiple Employment Discrimination Claims in the
Third Circuit, 45 VILL. L. REV. 743 (2000).
4. Courts use the phrases collateral estoppel and issue preclusion interchangeably. For the purposes of this article, I will use the term issue preclusion.
(SECOND)OF
See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); RESTATEMENT
JUDGMENTS
5 27 (1982); 18 MOORE,ET AL., supra note 1, at 'jl 132.01[2].
5. For various articles discussing the developments in issue preclusion,
see Wystan M. Ackerman, Precluding Defendantsfrom Relitigating Sentencing
Findings in Subsequent Civil Suits, 101 COLUM.L. REV. 128 (2001); Monica
Renee Brownewell, Rethinking the Restatement View (Again!): Multiple Independent Holdings and the Doctrine of Issue Preclusion, 37 VAL. U . L. REV.879
(2003); Philip C. Chronakis, Cold Comfort for a Change: Trends of Preclusion
in Habeas Corpus Litigation, 76 U . DET. MERCYL. REV.17 (1998); Collateral
and Equitable Estoppel of Federal Criminal Defendants, 29 RUTGERSL. REV.
1221 (1976); Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases-A Supplement to the DouHeinonline - - 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 754 2003-2004
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tion, the Supreme Court abandoned the requirement of mutuality6
in cases involving defensive issue precl~sion.~As a result, only
the party against whom issue preclusion is sought to be used must
~
years later, in Parklane
have been a party in the first a c t i ~ n .Eight
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, ~ n c .the
, ~ Supreme Court held that in the federal civil context, trial courts should have broad discretion in allowing offensive issue preclu~ion.'~Therefore, in federal civil
ble Jeopardy Protection, 21 RUTGERSL. REV. 274 (1967); Michael P. Daly,
"Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor," Your Collaterally Estopped Masses? Guilty
Pleas and Collateral Estoppel of Alienage in Criminal Proceedings: United
States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 44 VILL. L. REV. 671 (1999); Mitchell Keiter, The
Mauled Verdict: The Knoller Case Shows Why Res Judicata Should Protect
L. REV. 493 (2002);
Partial Convictions as Well as Acquittals, 33 MCGEORGE
Richard B. Kennelly, Jr., Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases, 80 VA. L. REV. 1379 (1994); David Lehn, Adjudicative
Retroactivity as a Preclusion Problem: Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, 59
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.AM. L. 563 (2004); The Due Process Roots of Criminal
Collateral Estoppel, 109 HARV.L. REV. 1729 (1996); Alan D. Vestal, Issue
Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IOWAL. REV. 281 (1980).
6. The doctrine of mutuality prevents a party from relying on a former
judgment unless he would have been bound by the judgment had the action been
decided the other way. See Kirby v. Penn. R.R. Co., 188 F.2d 793, 797 (3d Cir.
1951); Herbert Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties,
68 COLUM.L. REV.1457, 1459 (1968). An issue regarding mutuality arises
when one of the parties in the first action is different from one of the parties in
the second action. Under the traditional mutuality doctrine, there could be no
preclusion in the second action unless the parties were identical because different parties necessarily resulted in a judgment that could not bind the new party
in the second lawsuit.
7. In Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313
(1971), the Supreme Court abandoned the rule of mutuality in the federal courts
in the case of defensive issue preclusion. Id. at 349-50.
8. Assume that Bob sues Carl for negligence and loses on the ground
that Bob was contributorily negligent. Bob then sues Donald in a second action.
Donald asserts issue preclusion and argues that the issue of negligence has already been determined and that Bob is the negligent party. Donald, who was not
a party in the first action, is using issue preclusion defensively to defeat the
claim in the second action. Following Blonder-Tongue, Donald is permitted to
use issue preclusion to defeat Bob's claim as long as Bob was a party in the first
action.
9. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
10. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, Inc., 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Assume
that Bob sues Carl for negligence and loses on the ground that Bob was conHeinonline - - 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 755 2003-2004
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cases, issue preclusion can be used in the second lawsuit by either
the defendant or the plaintiff and can bind a party who was not a
party in the first action. ' I
Although first developed in civil litigation, collateral estoppel
has also been a rule of federal criminal law since 1916.'* More
recently, in 1970, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant's right to use issue preclusion offensively against the government is rooted in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy.13 Therefore, a defendant has a constitutional right to
assert issue preclusion against the government to prevent the government from relitigating an issue determined in a previous action
in favor of the defendant.14
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the rationale
enunciated in Parklane can be applied in the criminal context, thus
allowing the government to invoke offensive issue preclusion to
prevent the defendant from relitigating an issue that was decided in
a previous criminal trial in favor of the government. The lower
federal courts are divided on whether offensive collateral estoppel
is appropriate in the criminal context.15 Recent decisions have contributorily negligent. Now, in a second action, Donald sues Bob for harms resulting from the same accident. Donald asserts issue preclusion and argues that
Bob was already found to be negligent in the first action. This is an example of
offensive issue preclusion because Donald, who was not a party to the first action, is using issue preclusion to establish his claim.
11. See, e.g., Appling v State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 769 (9th
Cir. 2003) (allowing offensive issue preclusion to prevent defendant from relitigating whether termination without cause was a provision of the contract); Loeb
Indus., Inc. v Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 496 (7th Cir. 2002) (allowing
offensive issue preclusion and dismissing claims); Pena v. Travis, 2002 WL
31886175, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27,2002) (allowing defensive issue preclusion
and rejecting plaintiffs claim of civil rights violation where the same matter
brought against the same defendants in earlier action); Meador v Oryx Energy
Co., 87 F. Supp. 2d 658, 667 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (granting summary judgment to
defendant on grounds of issue preclusion when the issue raised in the second
suit had been adequately and finally litigated in the first case).
12. See United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
13. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
14. See id. at 445.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1243
(10th Cir. 1998) (refusing to allow offensive issue preclusion following a guilty
plea); United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 897 (3d Cir. 1993) (refusing to alHeinonline - - 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 756 2003-2004
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tinued to extend the law of issue preclusion by allowing the use of
offensive issue preclusion in criminal trials that involve issues of
citizenship status, while refusing to expand it to other contexts.I6
In a country that has been recently scarred by the events of
September 11, 2001, the current position of the courts is troubling.
According to the United States Census Bureau, between eight rnillow offensive issue preclusion); Hernendez-Uribe v. United States, 5 15 F.2d 20,
22 (8th Cir. 1975) (allowing offensive issue preclusion); Pena-Cabanillas v.
United States, 394 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1968) (allowing offensive issue preclusion); United States v. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. 619, 622 (S.D.Ca1. 1959)
(allowing offensive issue preclusion). Compare Hernandez-Uribe v. United
States, 515 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1057 (1976) (affirming defendant's conviction, holding that issue preclusion prevented defendant from relitigating his citizenship status, because the defendant was bound by
an earlier adjudication in which he pleaded guilty to a matter involving the same
crime) and Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1968)
(affirming defendant's conviction, holding that collateral estoppel prevented
defendant from relitigating his alien status, because it had already been determined under a prior adjudication) with United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150
F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 1998) (reversing the defendant's conviction, holding
that the government may not use a judgment following a plea of guilty to collaterally estop a criminal defendant from relitigating an issue in a subsequent
criminal proceeding) and United States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d 633, 636 (1 lth Cir.
1992) (reversing defendant's conviction, holding that the government may not
collaterally estop a criminal defendant from relitigating an issue decided against
the defendant in a different court in a prior proceeding).
16. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. currency in the amount of
$1 19,984.00, 304 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2002) (refusing to allow government to use
issue preclusion in a subsequent forfeiture proceeding); Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 897
(refusing to allow issue preclusion by government in case involving RICO);
Harnage, 976 F.2d at 636 (refusing to allow offensive use of issue preclusion by
government in case involving conspiracy to distribute drugs). Other than the
cases in footnote 15, there have been very few decisions aside from alienage
cases that have allowed offensive issue preclusion. In People v. Ford, 416 P.2d
132 (Cal. 1966), the California Supreme Court held in a felony-murder case that
the doctrine of issue preclusion applies to both civil and criminal cases. Ford,
416 P.2d at 138. In Carmody v. Seventh Judicial District Court In and For Lincoln County, 398 P.2d 706 (Nev. 1965), the Nevada Supreme Court stated in
dicta that issue preclusion could be applied against defendants in a case involving felony-murder. Carmody, 398 P.2d at 707. Finally, in United States v. Colacurcio, 514 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974), the court did not allow issue preclusion
under the facts of the case, but did state in dictum that issue preclusion could be
invoked against the defendant in all types of cases. Colacurcio, 514 F.2d at 6.
Heinonline - - 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 757 2003-2004
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lion and twelve million illegal aliens are believed to be living in
the United States, with anywhere from one million to three million
more expected this year." At the same time, to address the security concerns, the federal government has increased its emphasis on
interior enforcement of illegal aliens. The American public is experiencing the unleashing of xenophobia and is vulnerable to
demagoguery about the status of aliens in our country.
This article addresses whether the expansion of the doctrine of
issue preclusion in the federal criminal area should mirror the expansion of the doctrine in the federal civil area.18 The article examines the general requirements of issue preclusion and the evolution of issue preclusion in both the civil and criminal context.19
Next, this article examines the current status of offensive and defensive issue preclusion when the first suit is civil and the second
suit is ~riminal,~'
the first suit is criminal and the second suit is
and where both the first and second action is criminal.22
The article then analyzes whether the approach taken by the courts
17. See Kevin E. Deardorff & Lisa M. Blumerman, Evaluating Components of International Migration: Estimates of the Foreign-Born Population by
Migrant Status in 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper Series No. 58,
2001), http://www.census.gov/populatiodwww/documentatiodtwps0058.html;
Joe Costanzo, Cynthia Davis, Caribert Irazi, Daniel Goodkind, & Roberto Ramirez, Evaluating Components of International Migration: The Residual Foreign
Born (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper Series No. 61, 2001), http://www.
census.gov/populatiodww~/do~umentation/twpsOO6l
.htrnl.
18. I will only be addressing federal cases, although various state courts
have looked at this issue and have found different results. See, e.g., Gutierrez v.
Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding prior conviction for attempted murder is not preclusive in subsequent cases for murder involving same victim); State v. Stiefel, 256 So. 2d 581, 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972) (holding defendant has a right to a jury trial on all issues related to a
criminal charge); Rouse v. State, 97 A.2d 285 (Md. 1953) (holding that issue
preclusion would abridge the constitutional right of the accused to have the case
proved beyond a reasonable doubt); Carmody, 398 P.2d at 707 (Nev. 1965)
(finding that a guilty plea to the crime of robbery was preclusive in subsequent
trial for felony murder); State v. Thomas, 276 A.2d 391 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1971) (asserting that collateral estoppel is not available to the government).
19. See infra Part 11.
20. See infra Part 111-V.
21. See id.
22. See id.
Heinonline - - 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 758 2003-2004
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in the civil area should be applied to the criminal area, and the appropriate parameters of that approach.23 Finally, the article concludes that although the courts should allow the government to use
offensive collateral estoppel in criminal cases, the courts must be
vigilant in ensuring that there is no prejudice. 24

In both the civil and criminal context, issue preclusion may be
applied if certain elements are present.25 First, the issue on which
there was a decision in the prior litigation must be the same issue
that is being considered in the pending l i t i g a t i ~ n .Second,
~~
a decision on that issue must have been necessary for the judgment in the
first litigation and must have been a final judgment.27 Although
23. See infra Part VI.
24. See infra Part VII. But see Collateral and Equitable Estoppel, supra
note 6, for the argument that collateral estoppel should only be used for crimes
containing a status element.
25. The requirements of issue preclusion are set forth in 1B J.MOORE,
FEDERAL
PRACTICE
0.443[1] at 3901 (2d ed. 1974).
26. Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Sav. Assn., 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal.
1942).
27. Id. Because issue preclusion can only exist if the precise issue has
been litigated and was necessary to the judgment below, the court must examine
the first proceeding to determine if the issue decided was necessary for the
judgment. When the first proceeding is a civil suit, and the second proceeding is
also a civil suit, the court can look to see if there was a special verdict or findings of fact and conclusions of law in order to identify (1) how the issues were
decided and (2) whether they were necessary to the judgment. Even when the
first proceeding is a criminal prosecution, and the jury has returned a guilty verdict, it may be possible to determine the issues that were necessarily decided.
See Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 572 (1951)
(enunciating the trial court's role in looking at the first proceeding and explaining the findings to the jury in the second proceeding). When the first proceeding
is a criminal prosecution and the jury has returned an acquittal, it becomes very
difficult for the court to determine whether the issues were necessarily decided.
See United States v. King, 563 F.2d 559, 561 (2d Cir. 1977) (refusing to allow
the defendant to use issue preclusion in a second prosecution following an acquittal because the defendant could not demonstrate that the precise issue had
been necessarily litigated and decided in the first prosecution). In addition, it is
possible for issue preclusion to exist if a party fails to contest an issue that is
necessary to a decision and a judgment that is unfavorable to that party is found
Heinonline - - 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 759 2003-2004
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both of these elements raise a myriad of issues, they are not discussed at length in this article.
A third traditional requirement of issue preclusion in the civil
context has been that the parties in the second proceeding must be
the same as the parties in the first proceeding in which the issue
sought to be established was originally
A judgment
that was obtained in the first action could not be used in a subsequent action against someone who was not a party in that first action because that would violate the non-party's right to due proce ~ s Under
. ~ ~the traditional mutuality doctrine, courts held that, if a
judgment could not be used against one party because it would
violate due process, that judgment could also not be used offensively even though such use would not raise any constitutional implications.30 As a result, the doctrine of mutuality prevented a
party from relying on a former judgment unless that party would
have been bound by that judgment had the action been decided the
other way.3'
The move away from the strict requirement of mutuality in the
civil context began with the California state court's decision in
Bernhard v. Bank of A r n e r i ~ a .In
~ ~Bernhard, an ailing woman set

on that issue, a court in a subsequent proceeding may find that issue to be precluded. In criminal cases, this becomes a significant problem in cases where the
first proceeding is a guilty plea. Under the Restatement of Judgments approach,
there could be no issue preclusion because the first proceeding was not actually
§ 27 (1 982). However, a
litigated. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF JUDGMENTS
number of courts have held that the parties could use issue preclusion following
a guilty plea when the second litigation is a civil suit. See Ivers v. United
States, 581 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that a criminal conviction based
upon a guilty plea conclusively establishes that the defendant engaged in the
criminal act for which he was convicted).
28. Bemhard, 122 P.2d at 895.
29. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979);
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,329 (1971).
30. See Ralph Wolff & Sons v. N.Z. Ins. Co., 58 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Ky.
1933) ("To bind the plaintiffs the defendants must also have been bound, for an
estoppel is always mutual.").
31. Kirby v. Penn. R.R. Co., 188 F.2d 793, 797 (3d Cir. 1951); Bemhard,
122 P.2d at 894.
32. Bemhard, 122 P.2d at 895.
Heinonline - - 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 760 2003-2004
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up a joint account with her caretaker.33 The caretaker then removed the money from the joint account and set up a new account
in the caretaker's own name.34 The woman died, and as executor
of the estate, the caretaker did not include the money from the joint
account in the estate.35When the caretaker filed an accounting and
simultaneously resigned as executor, the other testamentary beneficiaries objected.36The probate court overruled the objections and
settled the account, finding that the woman had made a gift of the
money to the aret taker.^' Thus, in the first action, the caretaker
prevailed after a finding that the money was a gift.
In the second action, one of the testamentary beneficiaries became the administratrix following the caretaker's re~ignation.~~
This adrninistratrixheneficiary brought a new action against the
bank, alleging that it was liable for allowing the transfer of the
funds from the woman's account to the caretaker's account without
the woman's approval.39 The bank then sought issue preclusion
against the administratrix on the issue of the woman's consent,
based on the finding of the probate court in the first action that the
money was a gift.40 The administratrix argued the traditional doctrine of mutuality should apply because, since she could not have
used estoppel against the bank, then the bank could not use estoppel against the admini~tratrix.~'
The court rejected the mutuality argument in the context of
defensive issue preclusion, and stated that "[tlhe criteria for determining who may assert a plea of res judicata differ fundamentally
from the criteria for determining against whom a plea of res judicata may be asserted."42 Although due process forbids binding a
non-party to the judgment in the first action, if the party against
whom the claim is asserted has had his day in court, either person33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 893.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 893-94.
Id. at 894.
Id.
Heinonline - - 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 761 2003-2004
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ally or through a representative, then it should be proper to allow
the assertion of the doctrine against that party.43 In Bernhard, the
administratrix had already had her day in court in the first action;
and therefore, the bank could properly use the court's finding
against her.44 Thus, the California Supreme Court held that if a
party had already litigated the issue in the first civil action, that
particular finding could be used against that party in the second
action, even if the party asserting issue preclusion was not a party
in the first action.45
In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
~ o u n d a t i o n ,the
~ ~ United States Supreme Court, following the
changes set in motion by Justice Traynor in Bernhard, abandoned
the rule of mutuality in the federal courts in the case of defensive
issue precl~sion.~'The Court distinguished between offensive and
defensive use of non-mutual issue preclusion and held that, with
respect to defensive issue preclusion, there was no need to adhere
to the traditional doctrine of mutuality.48 As a result, in civil actions in the federal courts, when a party has already litigated an
issue in the first action, the finding can then be used against that
party in the second action, even if the party asserting defensive
issue preclusion was not a party in the first action.49
Eight years later in Parklane the Supreme Court dealt with the
more difficult issue of the offensive use of issue p r e c l u ~ i o n . In
~~
the first a ~ t i o n ,the
~ ' SEC sought injunctive relief against Parklane
on the grounds that Parklane had issued a materially false and rnisleading proxy ~ t a t e m e n t .The
~ ~ district court found for the SEC, a

43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45. Id. at 895.
46.
402 U.S. 313 (1971).
47.
Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350
(1971).
48.
Id. at 329-30.
49.
Id.
50.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, Inc., 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
51.
The first action actually began after the second action but concluded
first. Id. at 324. However, both actions arose out of the same transaction. Id. at
327.
52.
SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y.
Heinonline - - 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 762 2003-2004
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declaratory judgment was entered,53and the Second Circuit affirmed.54 The second action was a shareholders' derivative action
in which the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that Parklane should be estopped from relitigating the issue
it lost in the first action, namely whether the proxy statement was
The district court denied the motion on the
false and ~nisleading.~~
grounds that it would deprive the defendant of his right to a trial by
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the prior adjudication removed those facts from controversy; thus there was no
right to a trial by
Consequently, unlike Bernhard and
Blonder-Tongue, in which the parties were trying to use issue preclusion defensively, the Parklane plaintiffs were trying to use issue
preclusion offensively to establish their claim that the proxy statement was false and m i ~ l e a d i n g . ~ ~
The Court allowed the use of issue preclusion here even
though it was ~ffensive.~'Finding that the application of issue
preclusion would not deny Parklane its Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial, the Court held that Parklane had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the factual issues in the first trial.60 The Court
stated that in cases involving offensive issue preclusion, the trial
courts should have broad discretion in deciding whether issue preclusion is a p p r ~ p r i a t e . ~In~ making that determination, the trial
court should apply a balancing test to see whether the plaintiff
could have joined the first action but failed to do so, and whether
the second action presented procedural opportunities that were not
available in the first action.62

1976), a f d , 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
53. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. at 486-87.
54. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d at 1090.
55. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1977).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 819-22.
58. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, Inc., 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979).
59. Id. at 33 1-32.
60. Id. at 335-36.
61. Id. at 331.
62. Id. at 329-31.
Heinonline - - 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 763 2003-2004
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In the federal civil context, therefore, defensive issue preclusion is always allowed,63while offensive issue preclusion is allowed on a case-by-case basis, at the discretion of the trial judge.@
In the federal criminal context, on the other hand, a defendant has
been able to use issue preclusion to preclude the government from
relitigating an issue determined in a prior acquittal since 1 9 1 6 . ~ ~
Rejecting the civil rule of mutuality when issue preclusion is used
defensively, the courts have held that even though a criminal defendant cannot be estopped on an issue decided against him, the
defendant can use defensive issue preclusion to estop the government when the issue in the first proceeding was decided in the defendant's favor.66 The rationale is that the defendant "always has
the right to have the jury or the triers of fact determine anew every
element of
In Ashe v. ~wenson,~*which
was decided in 1970, one year
before Blonder-Tongue and nine years before Parklane, the Supreme Court held that asserting collateral estoppel against the government is a constitutional right of the accused, inherent in the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.69 In Ashe, the defendant and three other co-defendants were prosecuted for a robbery that occurred during a poker game.70 The defendant was acq ~ i t t e d . ~Six
' weeks later the defendant was brought to trial for a
second robbery that occurred during the same poker game.72 The
defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that he had previously
been acquitted.73 The court denied the motion and the defendant

Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of 111. Found., 402 U.S. 3 13, 3 13
Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 33 1.
65. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 88 (1916).
66. United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466,468 (3d Cir. 1943); United
States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479,482 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
67. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. at 482.
68. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
69. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,445 (1970).
70. Id. at 437-38.
7 1. Id. at 439.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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was convicted.74 The defendant then brought a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus on the ground that the second prosecution violated his constitutional right not to be put in double jeopardy.75
The United States Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that
"when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a
valid and final judgment, the issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit."76 Therefore, because
the jury in the first prosecution determined that there was reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was one of the robbers, the
state was precluded from presenting evidence on identification in
the second prosecution.77
The Court noted that the "rule of collateral estoppel in [federal] criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and
archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism
and rationality."78 The Court set out a test where the trial court has
to examine the record of the prior proceeding including the pleadings, evidence, and charge, and then determine whether a jury
could have reached its verdict on a ground other than what the defendant seeks to estop.79 If the trial court concludes that a jury
would not have reached its verdict under any other rationale, the
defendant is permitted to use issue preclusion against the government.80
Therefore, a defendant can use issue preclusion defensively in
a second criminal prosecution to bar the government from relitigating an issue that was decided in the first prosecution where the
defendant was acquitted. There is no requirement of mutuality.
This needs to be distinguished from the situation where the
government seeks to use issue preclusion offensively to bar the
defendant from relitigating an issue that was decided against the
defendant at a previous criminal trial. The Supreme Court has not
spoken on the issue and the lower courts are d i ~ i d e d . ~The
' analy74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 439-40.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 446.
Id.at444.
Id.
Id. at 445.
In Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384 (1971), the defendant was conHeinonline - - 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 765 2003-2004
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sis by the courts is further complicated when the action is either a
civil action or a criminal action that does not end in an acquittal or
conviction.
111. THECURRENT
STATUS
OF THE USE OF DEFENSIVE
ISSUE
PRECLUSION
Defensive issue preclusion comes into play when a party who
was a criminal defendant in a prior prosecution is either being sued
civilly or is being criminally prosecuted in a second action.82
When the actions involve similar issues, the defendant may argue
that an issue that has been decided in the first action should not be
relitigated, and that the prosecution or plaintiff should be bound by
that earlier deter~nination.~~
To use issue preclusion at all, the issue
on which there was a prior determination must be the same issue
that is being considered in the pending litigation, and a decision on
the issue must have been necessary for the judgment in the first
l i t i g a t i ~ n .The
~ ~ law is fairly clear that a criminal defendant may
use issue preclusion to bar a subsequent criminal prosecution if the
first criminal prosecution ended with either a jury verdict or a dismissal of the i n d i ~ t m e n t .The
~ ~ law is less clear if the first criminal
victed of armed robbery. Id. at 384. After a reversal for an error in jury instructions, the defendant was retried and acquitted. Id. He was then tried and convicted at a third trial for the robbery of a different person during the same incident. Id. at 385. The defendant argued that the issue of whether he was a robber
had already been decided at the previous trial, and therefore could not be relitigated. Id. The state appellate court held that the issue had been properly relitigated, reasoning that the first conviction nullified the later acquittal for purposes
of collateral estoppel. Id. at 386. The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that there is no requirement of mutuality under its decision in Ashe. Id.
Therefore, although the prior conviction could not be used against the defendant,
the prior acquittal could be used against the government. Id. Although this
could be interpreted as disapproval of the use of collateral estoppel by the government against criminal defendants, it is nowhere near definitive.
82. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85,87 (1916).
83. See, e.g., Ashe, 397 U.S. at 436 (holding that where defendant was
acquitted of robbery charge in the trial of one victim when witnesses unable to
identify him as participant, the government was precluded from subsequent
prosecution of defendant for same crime against a different victim).
84. Id. at 443.
85. Id. at 44445.
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prosecution ended with a plea bargain, or if the second action is
civil and not criminal.
Like the use of issue preclusion in the civil context, the doctrine of criminal defensive issue preclusion has its roots in common law.86 A criminal defendant first used issue preclusion to bar
a subsequent criminal prosecution in 1916 in United States v. Oppenheimer.87 In Oppenheimer, the defendant argued that the government was precluded from indicting him because the indictment
for the same offense had been dismissed on statute of limitations
grounds.88 The government argued that the defendant could not
assert issue preclusion because no jeopardy had attached in the first
p r o s e c ~ t i o n .Justice
~~
Holmes determined that even though double
jeopardy had not attached in the first proceeding, defensive criminal issue preclusion had its source in fundamental rights other than
the guarantee against double jeopardy.90 Based on this reasoning,
the Court affirmed the dismissal of the second indi~tment.~'
Following Oppenheimer, the use of defensive issue preclusion
in subsequent criminal prosecutions became important to protect
defendants in ways that were unavailable under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the ~onstitution.~'
In 1961, the Second Circuit continued its broad interpretation of defensive collateral estoppel,
holding in United States v. KrameP3 that an acquittal on burglary
86. In The Queen v. Miles, 24 Q.B.D. 423,431 (1890), the court held that
"the criminal law is in unison with that which prevails in civil proceedings" and
"where a criminal charge has been adjudicated . . . that adjudication, whether it
takes the form of an acquittal or conviction, is final . . . and may be pleaded in
bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offence . . . ."
87. 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
88. Id. at 86.
89. Id. at 87.
90. Id. at 87-88.
91. Id. at 88.
92. The Double Jeopardy Clause has been construed very narrowly. The
traditional test compares the statutory elements of each charged offense, and the
court looks to see "whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not." Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304
(1932). The Court has only expanded double jeopardy protections to bar subsequent prosecutions for lesser-included offenses. Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S.
682,682 (1977).
93. 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961).
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charges in the first action barred a subsequent action for conspiracy
to burglarize. 94
In 1970, in Ashe, the Court parted ways with Oppenheimer
when it constitutionalized issue preclusion as part of the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy rather than
grounding it as a requirement of due process.95 Ironically, rather
than broadening the use of defensive issue preclusion, the decisions following Ashe began to erode the use of the doctrine by
criminal defendants. In United States v. One Assortment of 89
irea arms,'^ the Court held that the defendant could not use issue
preclusion to bar a civil forfeiture proceeding following an acquittal because the acquittal did not prove that the defendant was innocent; rather, it only proved "the existence of reasonable doubt as to
his
The Court held that the government should still be
permitted to show in the civil forfeiture that the defendant had
been involved in criminal conduct by a preponderance of the evid e n ~ e .Six
~ ~years later, in Dowling v. United states,'' the Court
again limited the use of defensive issue preclusion.'00 In Dowling,
the defendant was acquitted of robbery in the first trial in which he
was allegedly identified when the victim unmasked him.''' In the
second action, the defendant was tried for a bank robbery in which

94. United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961). Many states
also followed that trend. See State v. Safrit, 551 S.E.2d 516 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001) (holding later trial on same charge involving different primary offense is
barred by preclusion); People v. Mitchell, 81 Cal. App. 4th 132 (2000) (determining state is prohibited under collateral estoppel doctrine from presenting
evidence on prior conviction when the evidence was insufficient to support a
sentence enhancement); State v. Secret, 524 N.W.2d 551 (Neb. 1994) (holding
an indeterminate sentence was barred by collateral estoppel); People v. Joon Ho
Chin, 186 Misc. 2d 454 (N.Y. Sup. 2000) (barring state by collateral estoppel
from introducing evidence of physical force during retrial of rape); People v.
Beltran, 210 P.2d 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); Harris v. State, 17 S.E.2d 573 (Ga.
1941).
95. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,44546 (1970).
96. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
97. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 361-62.
98. Id. at 362.
99. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
100. Dowling, 493 U.S. 342,349 (1990).
101. Id. at 344-45.
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he allegedly wore the same mask.lo2 The defendant argued that the
victim was precluded from testifying that the masked defendant
had robbed her.'03 The Court affirmed the defendant's conviction
because in the first trial the government had failed to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed the act, and to
introduce evidence of the same act in another trial, the government
only had to show that a jury could reasonably conclude that the
defendant had committed the act.Io4 Because of the difference in
the burdens of proof, the Court held that the defendant could not
use issue preclusion,105once again substantially restricting its use.
Therefore, even though the Court has held that the criminal
defendant's defensive use of issue preclusion against the government is not subject to the requirements of mutuality and, in fact, is
protected by the United States Constitution, its use has been limited. As a general rule, it can always be used in a second criminal
prosecution when the first prosecution ended in an acquittal.'06
There are many problems, however, if the second lawsuit is civil or
if the first lawsuit did not end in a jury verdict.

IV. THECURRENT
STATUS
OF THE USEOF CRIMINAL
OFFENSIVE
ISSUEPRECLUSION
The only guidance by the Supreme Court as to the use of offensive issue preclusion in criminal cases derives from Standefer v.
United States.Io7 In Standefer, the prosecution charged the defendant with aiding and abetting after the principal had already been
acquitted of the substantive ~ffense.'~'The defendant unsuccessfully argued that the prosecution should be estopped from prosecuting him because the individual whom he had allegedly aided
and abetted had been acquitted by a jury.'09 The Court recalled
that it had authorized "nonmutual collateral estoppel" in both
Id.
Id. at 344-47.
Id. at 348-49.
Id. at 349.
See supra note 27.
447 U.S. 10 (1980).
Id. at 11-13.
Id. at 13.
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Blonder-Tongue and Parklane, and that the estoppel applied in
Parklane was offen~ive."~The defendant in Standefer, however,
was not attempting to use offensive issue preclusion, but was attempting to use defensive issue preclusion.'" The Court distinguished Standefer from Parklane and Blonder-Tongue and rejected
the "application of nonmutual [collateral] estoppel in criminal
cases.""2 Although some courts have construed this to mean that
the Court "declined to extend Parklane to criminal case^,""^ the
more rational conclusion is that the Court did not reach any conclusions about offensive preclusion in criminal cases. The facts
did not deal with offensive issue preclusion; the Court did not discuss offensive preclusion; and its analysis only discusses why
nonmutual defensive issue preclusion was not appropriate in the
case.'I4
The first lower court case where the government used issue
preclusion offensively against a criminal defendant was United
States v. p angel-~erez."~ The defendant in Rangel-Perez was
convicted in 1943 of illegal entry into the United States from Mexico.l16 The indictment underlying that conviction stated that the
defendant had been deported from the United States in 1941 and
was discovered back in the United States in 1942."' Approximately fifteen years later, the defendant, after being discovered in
California, was again indicted and tried for illegal entry at a trial
before a judge.''' At the second trial, the government argued that
the issue as to whether the defendant was an alien in 1943 was
110. Id. at 21.
111. Id. The defendant urged the Court "to apply nonmutual estoppel
against the Government." Id.
112. Id. at 23.
113. United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 894 n.7 (3d Cir. 1994).
114. Standefer, 447 U.S. at 22-23. The Court stated that it was concerned
about an erroneous acquittal, perhaps the result of jury nullification, which could
then multiply by binding future juries. Id.
115. 179 F. Supp. 619 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
116. Id. at 621. For the relevant statutory language, see 8 U.S.C. § 180
(1940), which required that a defendant knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously enter the United States. 8 U.S.C. 5 180 (repealed June 27, 1952) has
been replaced by 8 U.S.C. $3 1101(g) and 1326.
117. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. at 622.
118. Id.at622.
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fully adjudicated at the earlier trial, and that issue preclusion could
therefore be invoked against the defendant to alleviate the need to
~ court held that the
determine the defendant's c i t i z e n ~ h i ~ . "The
government could invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel against
the accused to establish his nationality status as being that of alien
in 1943.l2' The issue of the defendant's citizenship was actually
litigated at the 1943 trial, a finding of fact that the defendant was
an alien was made, and this finding was necessary to the judgment
of guilty of the crime of illegal entry.12' Therefore, the court, for
the first time, allowed the government to invoke non-mutual offensive issue preclusion. 122
Nine years later, in Pena-Cabanillas v. United ~ t a t e s , the
'~~
Ninth Circuit also addressed whether the government could use
offensive issue preclusion to prevent the defendant from relitigating his status as an alien.124In Pena-Cabanillas, the defendant was
convicted in 1964 for falsely and willfully representing himself to
be a United States citizen.'25 In the second trial, the defendant was
indicted and tried for the offense of illegal entry into the United
States.'26 In the second action, the district court took judicial notice of the 1964 conviction and held that since the issue of citizenship was the same in both trials, the defendant was precluded from
offering evidence pertaining to his citizenship up to and including
the 1964 con~iction.'~'Following the reasoning of the court in
Rangel-Perez, the court found that the district court had correctly
allowed offensive issue p r e c l u ~ i o n . ' ~ ~
In 1975, the Eighth Circuit also upheld the use of offensive issue preclusion in Hernandez-Uribe v. United state^,"^ which also

119. Id.
120. Id. at 626-27.
121. Id. at 626.
122. Id.
123. 394 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1968).
124. Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1968).
125. Id. at 786. The defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 5 91 1
(2003). Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 786.
128. Id. at 787-88.
129. 515 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1975).
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involved the crime of illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. 5 1326.I3O The
district court instructed the jury that the defendant was bound by
an earlier judicial determination that he was an alien as of 1967,
and therefore the jury could not consider any evidence pertaining
to his citizenship as of that date.13' The defendant appealed, arguing that the instruction deprived "him of his right to a presumption
of innocence, his sixth amendment right to a trial by jury, and his
right to confrontation of witnesses . . . ."132The court held that by
pleading guilty in the 1967 case involving the same crime, the defendant admitted all of the essential elements of the crime, including that he was an alien until June 1967, and therefore issue preclusion was proper.'33 Although the defendant attempted to distinguish this case from Pena-Cabanillas and Rangel-Perez by arguing
that the earlier finding of alienage in his case was the result of a
guilty plea and not a full adversary proceeding, the court held that
procedures surrounding a guilty plea ensure that there is a factual
basis and therefore issue preclusion is still a p p r ~ p r i a t e . ' ~ ~
More recently, in United States v. G a l l a r d o - ~ e n d e z , the
'~~
Tenth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction for violating 8

130. Id. at 20-2 1 .
131. Id. at 21.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 22. In 1980, the Ninth Circuit again addressed the issue in
United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1980). In BejarMatrecios, the defendant was tried for illegal reentry into the United States under 8 U.S.C. Q 1326. Id. at 82. At the trial, the government introduced evidence
that showed that the defendant had once pled guilty to a violation of 8 U.S.C. Q
1325, which is misdemeanor illegal entry. Id. at 83. The government argued
that under a theory of offensive issue preclusion the defendant's citizenship
status had been determined by that prior conviction and could not be relitigated.
Id. The district court allowed the preclusion. Id. Although the Ninth Circuit
reversed the conviction on the grounds that the manner in which the government
introduced the evidence was highly prejudicial, the court did emphasize that the
doctrine of issue preclusion applies equally whether the previous criminal conviction is based on a jury verdict or a guilty plea. Id. at 83-84. Had the evidence been properly introduced, evidence of the prior conviction would have
conclusively established that the defendant was an alien at the time of the Q 1325
conviction. Id. at 84.
135. 150 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 1998).
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U.S.C. 8 1 3 2 6 . ' ~The
~ court held that the government may not use
a judgment resulting from a plea of guilty to preclude "a criminal
defendant from relitigating an issue in a subsequent criminal pro~eeding."'~
In~this case, the defendant was indicted for violating 8
U.S.C. 5 1326 in 1991, pled guilty, and was d e ~ 0 r t e d . lIn
~ ~1996
the defendant was again found in the United States, and was indicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 for the "illegal reentry of a deported
alien."'39 The government requested that the defendant be precluded from contesting "his alienage prior to his 1991 conviction."l4' The defendant objected, but the district court invoked issue preclusion and instructed the jury that that there had been a
judicial determination that prior to 1991 the defendant was not a
citizen, and that "[tlhe defendant is bound by that determination."14' The court did not address the broad question of whether
issue preclusion could be asserted against a criminal defendant, but
instead looked at the more narrow issue of whether a guilty plea
can be used to preclude the defendant from relitigating an issue in
a subsequent
Disagreeing with the Eighth Circuit in Hernandez-Uribe, the court found that the rules of criminal procedure
do not protect the defendant in the same way as the protections
afforded by a jury trial and the Due Process Clause of the United
Therefore, the court reversed the defenStates Con~titution.'~~
dant's conviction and remanded the case for a new
The Ninth Circuit has also approved, in theory, the offensive
use of issue preclusion in a case not involving a status issue. 145 ln
United States v. ~ o l a c u r c i o ,the
' ~ ~defendant appealed a conviction
for income tax evasion alleging that the district court erred when it
allowed certain facts from a previous proceeding to be considered
Id. at 1246.
Id.
Id. at 1241.
Id.
Id. at 1241-42.
Id.
Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1246.
See United States v. Colacurcio, 514 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1975).
514 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1975).
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"as a fact proven in these proceeding^."'^^ The defendant was precluded in the second action from denying that he had received specific amounts of money.'48 The district court held that although
Rangel-Perez and Pena-Cababillas were "limited to the question
of [a] defendant's status, the rationale of those cases" applies
equally to cases that do not deal with status issues.'49 The Ninth
Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction, however, on the
grounds that the specific amount of the payments was not a necessary element of the first conviction, and therefore did not satisfy
the "necessarily litigated and essential to the judgment" requirement of issue preclusion.'50
In addition to the Ninth Circuit, other circuits have not allowed the government to use offensive issue preclusion. For in' ~ 'Eleventh Circuit anastance, in United States v. ~ a r n a ~ e ,the
lyzed whether the government could "preclude a defendant from
relitigating a prior unsuccessful attempt to quash a subpoena in a
different [federal] court."Is2 The court refused to allow offensive
collateral estoppel, finding that it would not serve its original purpose-judicial e~onomy."~In addition, in United States v. Pel ~ l l o ,the
' ~ ~Third Circuit held that the application of offensive issue preclusion deprived the defendant of his right to a jury trial."'
In Pelullo, the defendant was convicted in 1991 of forty-nine
counts of wire fraud.Is6 On appeal, the court affirmed the conviction of count fifty-four, but reversed the conviction on all other
counts because of the erroneous admission of some testimony.'57
The defendant was retried, and convicted, and was sentenced for
all convictions, including count fifty-four in 1993.Is8 The defen-

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
976 F.2d 633 (1 1 th Cir. 1992).
Hamage, 976 F.2d at 635.
Id.
14 F.3d 881 (3d Cir. 1994).
Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 889.
Id. at 885.
Id.
Id.
Heinonline - - 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 774 2003-2004

2004

Issue Preclusion

775

dant was again indicted for violations of RICO, and during the
second trial, the district court admitted evidence of the conviction
of count fifty-four for the purpose of proving the RICO count.15'
The court then instructed the jury that "as a matter of law, the defendant has committed the wire fraud offense . . . [tlhat means you
don't have to consider whether the government has proved this
offense.77160
The lower courts are split as to whether the offensive use of
issue preclusion should be allowed.161 The courts that have embraced it have all used it against defendants in cases involving citizenship status.162Although some courts have stated that it could be
applied to defendants in any situation, those courts have not actu~~
some circuits have
ally allowed it for different r e a ~ 0 n s . IFinally,
refused to allow offensive issue preclusion in any ~ i t u a t i o n . ' ~ ~
BOTHFORAND AGAINST
USINGOFFENSIVE
V. THEARGUMENTS
ISSUEPRECLUSION
IN CRIMINAL
CASES
The arguments for and against using offensive issue preclusion against a criminal defendant fall into two different categories.
First, there is the issue of whether offensive issue preclusion deprives the criminal defendant of his constitutional rights under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.'@ Second, if those rights are not
violated, the question becomes whether the use of defensive issue
preclusion satisfies the policies behind issue prec1u~ion.l~~
A. Constitutional Arguments
The right to a trial by jury in a criminal proceeding is set forth
in Article 111 of the Constitution, which states that "[tlhe [tlrial of
159. Id. at 887.
160. Id.
161. See supra notes 115, 123, 129, 135, 151, and 154.
162. See, e.g., United States v. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.Ca1.
1959).
163. See United States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d 633, 634-36 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
164. See United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881 (3d Cir. 1994).
165. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
166. United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1240 (10th Cir.
1998); Hamage, 976 F.2d at 635.
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all crimes . . . shall be by Ulury.,9167 This right is reiterated in the
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides "[iln all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .,9168 The main function
of the jury is to determine the facts of the case and to render a decision regarding the guilt or innocence of the criminal defendant.16'
One constitutional argument against the use of offensive issue
preclusion against a criminal defendant is that issue preclusion deprives the jury in the second trial of the opportunity to consider all
of the evidence that affected the determination of guilt or innocence.l7' The language of the Sixth Amendment makes it clear that
the right to a jury trial extends to each new criminal proceeding,
not merely until one jury determines an issue.l7l Issue preclusion
stands for the principle that "when an issue of ultimate fact has
once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue
cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future
lawsuit.9,172 When a court applies issue preclusion it instructs the
jury that a required element of the case is already conclusively settled, thereby precluding the jury from a complete view of the
facts.'73 The jury in the first trial could have reached a different
result from the jury in the second trial, and thus the jury in the second trial must be presented with all of the evidence relating to the

167. U. S. CONST.art 111, $ 2, c1.3.
168. U. S. CONST.amend VI.
169. "[Tlhe question is not whether guilt may be spelt out of a record, but
whether guilt has been found by a jury." Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S.
607,614 (1946). See generally Baltimore & Carolina Line Inc. v. Redman, 295
U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (holding that while it is the court's province to decide the
law and to instruct the jury as to the principles of law that govern its deliberations, it is the jury, and the jury alone, that determines the facts); State v. Ingenito, 432 A.2d 912, 916 (N.J. 1981) (stating that although it is important that
the evidence before the jury be as full and complete as possible in order to aid
the jury in the discharge of its fundamental responsibilities, "[ilt is not ...the
evidence of record that establishes a defendant's guilt or innocence but the
jury's determination of the facts drawn from such evidence.").
170. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1243.
United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 895 (3d Cir. 1994).
17 1.
172. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,443 (1970).
173. See State v. Ingenito, 432 A.2d 912,916 (N.J. 1981).
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charge. '74 The jury is unable to fully perform "its paramount deliberative and decisional resp~nsibilities"'~~
and therefore the defendant's right to a jury trial is fundamentally abridged.
Another constitutional argument is that a textual and procedural analysis of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, compared to the Seventh Amendment civil right to a jury trial, supports
the conclusion that offensive issue preclusion cannot be applied in
a criminal proceeding. The Seventh Amendment states, "In Suits
in common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . .
.'y176In contrast, the Sixth Amendment provides an absolute right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
Courts have
held that issue preclusion can be applied in the civil context because the right to a jury trial is preserved rather than guaranteed.17'
Therefore, the difference in the language of the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments provides a textual anchor for the proposition that
issue preclusion may not be applied against a criminal defendant.'79
The courts that have allowed offensive issue preclusion have
found that the defendant's right to a jury trial is not compromised
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. U.S. CONST.amend. VII.
177. U.S. CONST.amend. VI ("In all criminal Prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .").
178. See U.S. CONST.amend. VII. There are also procedural differences
between criminal and civil trials that could be used to support the conclusion
that preclusion is only appropriate in civil cases. In Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, the Court references these procedural devises to support its holding that
collateral estoppel does not infringe on the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 335-37 (1919). See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-94 (1943) (stating that a directed verdict does not violate the Seventh Amendment); Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-99 (1931) (holding retrial limited to question
of damages does not violate the Seventh Amendment); Fidelity & Deposit Co.
of Maryland v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 321 (1902) (holding that summary
judgment does not violate the Seventh Amendment).
179. United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 894 (3d Cir. 1994). When
both the Sixth and Seventh Amendments were being ratified in 1791, collateral
estoppel was being applied against a defendant in civil cases, but there are no
cases where the government was allowed to invoke collateral estoppel. Id. at
894-95. Therefore, "the framers intended them to have [a] different import by
using dramatically different language[s]." Id. at 895.
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in any way.lsO The elements of issue preclusion require that the
issue be fully litigated and necessarily decided in the first proceeding.lgl The defendant is therefore afforded all of the procedural
benefits of a.crimina1 proceeding including the incentive to fully
litigate the issue in the first tria1.Ig2 There is no additional fact
finding function for the jury to perform because the facts of the
common issue were resolved in the first action.lg3
It is true that a jury is less informed when an accused is unable
to relitigate a certain issue in a second trial, but this does not seem
to compromise the defendant's right to a jury trial under the Sixth
Amendment.184 There are other situations where, as in issue preclusion, a court can take a subsequent action against a defendant
without giving the defendant the benefit of a jury deliberation.Ig5
The defendant was able to exercise his constitutional rights in the
first tria1.1g6 There is no fact finding function in the second trial,
because, as the Supreme Court has stated, "the whole premise of
issue preclusion is that once an issue has been resolved in a prior
proceeding, there is no further fact finding function to be performed.,3187 In addition, a jury can still choose to acquit in the

180. See, e.g., Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20 (8th Cir.
1975).
181. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF JUDGMENTS
5 27 (1982); United States
v. Crooks, 804 F.2d 1441, 1446 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that in the criminal context, the collateral estoppel analysis involves a three-step analysis: (1) whether
"the issues in the two actions are [identical in order to] determine whether they
are sufficiently similar and material to justify invoking the [collateral estoppel]
doctrine;" (2) whether, after an examination of the first record, it can be determined that the issue was fully litigated; and (3) whether, after an examination of
the first record, it can be ascertained that the issue was necessarily decided).
182. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Stites, 258 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir.
2001).
183. Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 336 n.23.
184. Kennelly, supra note 6 at 1405-06.
185. Id. at 1407. Professor Kennelly uses the harmless error review, the
revocation of probation, and the appellate entry of conviction on lesser-included
offenses as three examples of situations where a prior conviction justifies the
court acting against the defendant without the defendant having an additional
jury trial. Id.
186. Kennelly, supra note 6, at 1405.
187. Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 336 n.23.
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second action.Ig8 Therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial is not sufficient to make offensive issue preclusion unavailable to the government.
A third constitutional argument is that the application of offensive issue preclusion by the government violates the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to due process.lg9 Under the Due
Process Clause, a criminal defendant has the right to a deterrnination by a jury of whether the prosecution has proved every element
of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.lgOBy finding that
an element of the crime has been conclusively proven, the argument is that the prosecution is relieved of its burden of proof.19'
Not only is the prosecution relieved of its burden of proof, but the
burden shifts to the defendant to overcome the prejudice of the jury
created by the knowledge of the previous determination.19'
In addition, the application of offensive issue preclusion jeopardizes the defendant's presumption of innocence, which is guaranteed under the Due Process ~ 1 a u s e . l A
~ ~criminal defendant's
right to a presumption of evidence "is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of
the administration of our criminal law.7,194 An instruction to a jury
that one element is conclusively determined may constitute a
strong "pull towards a guilty verdict.,3195 Thus, issue preclusion
violates the Due Process Clause because it threatens the presumption of innocence guaranteed to every criminal defendant.
It seems, however, that if issue preclusion does not violate the
right to a jury trial or the right to confront witnesses, then it should

188. Kennelly, supra note 6 at 1405.
189. United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 1998).
190. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Supreme Court stated,
"we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Id. at 354.
191. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Gallardo-Mendez, 150
F.3d at 1240; United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107 (6th Cir. 1995).
192. See State v. Ingenito, 432 A.2d 912, 916-19 (N.J. 1981).
193. Id. at 912; see Byrd v. People, 58 P.3d 50 (Colo. 2002); People v.
Goss, 521 N.W.2d 312 (Mich. 1994).
194. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,453 (1895).
195. Ingenito, 432 A.2d at 918-19.
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satisfy due process.lg6 Although under the doctrine of issue preclusion, a jury could hear about a defendant's prior conviction, this
would only happen if the crime relates to a central issue in the second trial, not if it only relates to motive.lg7 If the court finds that
applying issue preclusion would be fundamentally unfair and violate a defendant's due process rights, the court could refuse to apply it in that particular case.
B. Policy Arguments

In addition to constitutional arguments, courts have refused to
use offensive issue preclusion in criminal cases because the policy
reasons used to support preclusion in civil cases do not justify the
use of the doctrine against criminal defendants.Ig8 The notion of
judicial efficiency and finality has been invoked in civil trials to
support the use of issue preclusion since the prompt resolution of
claims and finality are desirable goals in civil litigation.Ig9 The
issue becomes whether these considerations have the same worth
in criminal cases as they do in civil case^.^" Courts have determined that the efficiencies of issue preclusion pale in comparison
to the importance of upholding a criminal defendant's right to vigorously defend himself and protect his libert~.~"In Parklane, the

196. See Kennelly, supra note 6 (pointing out how the state courts that
have expressed concern about due process really seem to be talking about the
right to trial and to confront witnesses).
OF JUDGMENTS5 27 (1982). One of the
197. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)
elements of issue preclusion is that the issue be identical in the first and second
action. Id.
198. See United States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d 633, 634 (11th Cir. 1992)
(declining to allow offensive issue preclusion against the accused, the Eleventh
Circuit decided that ruling on the collateral estoppel motion would consume at
least as much time as relitigating the issue, thereby "completely defeating the
doctrine's goal [of] judicial efficiency and economy.").
199. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 332, 326, 329-30 (1979);
Blonder-Tongue Labs. Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971).
200. United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240 (6th Cir. 1995);
Brazzell v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1974); Hyslop v. United States, 261
F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1958).
201. See Lucido v. Superior Court of Mendocino County, 795 P.2d 1223,
1232 (Cal. 1990). A criminal defendant has interest of immense importance at
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Court advocated the use of offensive issue preclusion in civil
cases, but cautioned that the "offensive use of collateral estoppel
does not promote judicial economy in the same manner as defensive collateral estoppel'7202 since "it may be unfair to defenjudicial efficiency may be vitiated by the
d a n t ~ . ' ' ~In~ addition,
~
necessarily detailed review of the previous criminal proceeding to
ensure that the defendant's rights have been protected.
Yet, the use of offensive issue preclusion by the government
has resulted in judicial efficiency.204 Illegal immigration puts an
added burden on federal courts by requiring the determination of
an alien's status prior to deportation. The federal docket backlog
continues to grow and may deleteriously affect the quality of the
federal courts.205
The most serious problem is that issue preclusion has only
been applied to defendants in cases involving alienage status is-

stake, "both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1969). In his dissent in Ashe, Justice
Burger stated that "in criminal cases, finality and conservation of private, 'public,
and judicial resources are lesser values than in civil litigation . . . . [Clourts that
have applied the collateral-estoppel concept to criminal actions would certainly
not apply it to both parties, as is true in civil cases . . . ." Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436,464-65 (Burger, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
202. Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 329.
203. Id. at 330.
204. See Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 21-22 (8th Cir.
1975) (holding that the relitigation of alienage issues undermines the purpose of
federal immigration laws); Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 78788 (9th Cir. 1968) (noting that without the threat of collateral estoppel, defendants would have the added incentive to attempt to illegally reenter the United
States) But see Jonathan C. Thau, Collateral Estoppel and the Reliability of
Criminal Determinations: Theoretical, Practical, and Strategic Implications for
Criminal and Civil Litigation, 70 GEO.L.J. 1079, 1083 (1982) (finding that
offensive issue preclusion does not promote judicial economy).
205. See Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking
Plaint~ffAutonomy and the Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U.
P m . L. REV. 809, 81 1 (1989) (noting that duplicative litigation and resulting
docket delays cause major problems in federal courts); Leonidas Ralph
Mecham, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Judicial
Caseload: A Five-Year Retrospective (1998), http://www.uscourts.gov/
caseload.pdf (finding that federal courts' caseload has reached record heights).
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sues, which rings suspiciously of xenophobia.206Since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been serious scrutiny of
the immigration laws. There were calls to halt immigration altogether,207draft harsher immigration laws,208close the borders with
Canada and ~ e x i c o and
, ~ ~stop
~ the issuance of foreign student
isa as.^" Although none of these things happened, there continues
to be a heightened awareness of issues with immigration. One way
to address security concerns is through interior enforcement. More
than ever, federal immigration authorities are using federal criminal laws to target illegal alien^.^" Immigration officials are being
206.
207.

Daly, supra note 6, at 694-95.
See Eric Lichtblau, Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Nick Anderson, After

The Attack; Security Clampdown; Government Seeks Expanded Powers to Plug
Security Holes; Safety: Oficials want tougher immigration restrictions and
greater use of wiretaps on terrorism suspects, L.A. TIMES,Sept. 17,2001, at A9

(noting that "[slome immigration experts speculate that the Bush administration
could consider invoking Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
giving the president the authority to restrict the exit and entry of any foreign
nationals."); see also Myriam Marquez, Editorial, To Ideologues: Stop Painting
SENTINEL,
Sept. 27,2001, at A15.
The War In Your Own Image, ORLANDO
208. See Greg Miller & Nick Anderson, After the Attack; National Security; Mood Swlfrly Changes on Immigration, L.A. TIMES,Sept. 18, 2001, at A12
(reporting that "[tlhe White House made it clear Monday [September 17, 20011
that tightening restrictions will be on its agenda, too, as Atty. Gen. John
Ashcroft said new immigration measures will be part of an anti-terrorism legislative package delivered to Congress this week.").
209. See Courtney Lingle, Mexican Immigrants Fear Border Closing, Local Community Pleads: Don't Punish Us For Attacks, DENVERPOST, Sept. 26,
2001 at A1 1; see also Editorial, Step up, clamp down; If the United States is to
become safer and more secure from terrorism, Canada needs to be more strict
JOURNAL-CONST~ON,
with its border and immigration regulations, ATLANTA
Sept. 26,2001, at A12.
210. See Ved P. Nanda, Tightened Visa Restrictions Have Flaws, DENVER
POST,Nov. 5, 2001, at B7 (stating that "[s]hortly after Sept. 11, Sen. Dianne
Feinstein, D-Calif., proposed a six-month moratorium on student visas. After
discussions with several prominent university officials, however, she instead
proposed more careful tracking."); see also Jonathan Peterson & Rebecca
Trounson, Response To Terror; Foreign Students Scrutinized, L.A. TIMES,Sept.
29, 2001, at A l ; see also Carolyn Lochhead, Feinstein tries to put student visas
Sept. 28,
on hold; Hijack suspect abused system, she says, S.F. CHRONICLE,
2001, at Al.
21 1. For example, in April 2003, John Ashcroft ordered all Haitians seekHeinonline - - 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 782 2003-2004
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unusually aggressive in deporting aliens to countries such as Ja~ ~ ~use of collateral estoppel,
maica, Guyana, and ~ o n d u r a s .The
especially in cases involving citizenship status, has the potential to
be abused in this time of heightened scrutiny. This is bolstered by
the fact that even before this increase in emphasis on interior enforcement, the only time that courts have successfully used offensive issue preclusion was in immigration
Therefore, it is
important that any test be extremely sensitive to potential abuse as
a result of xenophobia.

VI. A NEWTEST:RULESPLUSFAIRNESS
Upon balance, offensive issue preclusion, if applied carefully
and consistently, is a useful tool. The main problem, however, is
that the courts only seem to embrace it in cases that deal with the
alienage status issue. Therefore, it is important to address this
concern in formulating a test for the courts to follow. On the other
hand, a danger arises in formulating a test that becomes so complex that the "goal of greater fairness is also thwarted.,9214 u ~ h ~
critical task," therefore, is to "define rules that provide answers
that are both clear and just for most cases, and that incorporate levels of flexibility and discretion that permit just results in special
cases without undermining the general rules.7,215
In Parklane, the Supreme Court created a broad discretionary
test for allowing offensive preclusion in civil cases in the federal
Although the Court did not explicitly set out factors that
subsequent courts should examine, the Court did state its concerns

ing asylum to be indefinitely detained on the ground that immigration from Haiti
is a threat to national security. Immigration authorities were even deporting
immigrants to Somalia, where there is no functioning government and where alQueda has allegedly established a base of operations. See Ali v. Ashcroft, 346
F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (granting an injunction forbidding those deportations).
2 12. See www.usdoj .gov/oig/speciaY03-061.
213. See supra notes 115, 123, 129, 135, 151, and 154.
214.
18 CHARLESA. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARDH.
COOPER,
FEDERAL
PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE
$4403, at 45 (2d ed. 2002).
215. Id. § 4416, at 400.
216. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, Inc., 439 U.S. 322,331 (1979).
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about the use of offensive preclusion.'" For example, if the darnages in the first lawsuit were small, the defendant might not have
litigated the first suit aggre~sivel~."~
If there were different procedural options available in the first and second actions, the defendant might not have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the
The Court also had concerns about plaintiffs adoptfirst a ~ t i o n . " ~
ing a "wait and see" attitude, hoping that another plaintiff will
bring a suit against the defendant that results in a favorable judgment.'" Instead of aiding judicial economy, this attitude thwarts it
by keeping plaintiffs from consolidating initial lawsuit^.'^' Yet,
the Court held that "the preferable approach for dealing with these
problems . . . [is] to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine
when it should be applied.,7222
This test is too broad to be useful in applying non-mutual offensive issue preclusion in the criminal context. Further, the concerns that are raised on the civil side are different from the concerns raised on the criminal side. For example, there is little concern that prosecutors will adopt a "wait and see" attitude and bring
separate prosecutions to perfect their case.223On the other hand,
the constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants raise
grave concerns about individual freedom and rights.
, ~ ~Massachusetts
~
District
In United States v. ~ e v a s s e u r the
Court created a test in a complicated criminal RICO case involving
numerous pre-trial motions.22s The defendants had been "previ217. Id. at 329-31.
218. Id. at 330-31.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 330.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 33 1 .
223. Prosecutors have little to gain by bringing separate prosecutions to
perfect their cases. In United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993), the Court
pointed out that under Ashe, an acquittal in the first action will probably bar
litigation of essential facts in a new prosecution of the same defendant. Id. at
710-11 n.15 (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)). In addition, prosecutors should "be deterred from abusive, repeated prosecutions" because of
limited judicial resources and other demands on their time. Id.
224. 699 F. Supp. 965 (D. Mass. 1988).
225. United States v. Levasseur, 699 F. Supp. 965 (D. Mass. 1988), rev'd
on other grounds, 846 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1988). The defendants were indicted
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ously tried in the Eastern District of New York on an indictment
charging them with conspiracy to bomb buildings," an actual
bombing, and an attempted bombing.226Following a trial, the defendants were convicted on some of the counts and a mistrial was
declared for the other counts wherein the jury was unable to reach
a
The government then decided to pursue these "open
counts" in a Massachusetts federal
All of the open counts
from the trial in the Eastern District of New York were among the
predicate acts set out in the Massachusetts indictment to sustain the
alleged RICO violation.229 The defendants moved to suppress,
seeking to preclude the government from introducing evidence of
the predicate acts that had already been tried in the Eastern District
of New York and had resulted in a mistrial.230 In response, the
government asserted that, because the substance of the defendants'
motion to dismiss had already been litigated and denied in a case
involving the same defendants in the Eastern District of New York,
the defendants should be collaterally estopped from suppressing
the evidence.231
In order to render its decision, the Massachusetts court created
a test outlining criteria that must be met to allow the government to
use offensive issue preclusion.232 First, there must be an exact
identity of the issues in both proceedings.233Second, "a defendant
must have had sufficient incentive to have vigorously . . . litigated
the issue in [the] previous proceeding."234 Third, "the defendant
estopped must have been a party to the previous litigation.9,235
Fourth, the applicable law has to be identical in both proceed-

for three counts of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, 18 U.S.C. 5 1962(c). Id. at 968.
226. Id. at 969.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 969-70.
229. Id. at 970.
230. Id. at 979.
23 1. Id. at 980.
232. Id. at 981.
233. Id. This is an element of preclusion under any test.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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i n g ~ Finally,
. ~ ~ ~ "the first proceeding must result in a final judgment on the merits that provides the defendant" with the opportunity and incentive to
The court also noted that even if
this criteria is satisfied, offensive issue preclusion "may still be
improper under certain circumstances," such as a change in the
governing law, or a showing that the defendant had ineffective assistance of counsel at the first proceeding.238
The Levasseur test, which is much more specific than the test
in Parklane, provides a framework that could be applied to all
criminal cases involving offensive preclusion.239The requirement
that the issues be identical in both lawsuits, the requirement that
the defendant have had sufficient incentive to vigorously litigate
the issue in the first litigation, and the requirement that the first
litigation end in a final judgment all must be satisfied to meet the
general elements of p r e c l u ~ i o n . ~These
~
protect the defendant
from violations of the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment because the facts of the common issue were resolved in the
first action.24' Under this framework, a guilty plea by itself could
not be a basis for preclusion because the issues would not have
been fully litigated.242

236. Id. In explaining this element, the court stated that "if the proceedings . . . take place in districts in different circuits, the defendant cannot be estopped unless the governing law is the same." Id. There was no additional
precedent provided for this element. When the court applied this element to the
facts of the case before it, the court found that the case law was identical because the law applying to the collateral estoppel issue was mostly Supreme
Court precedent. Levasseur, 669 F. Supp. at 981. It is not clear whether the
court was refemng to the law of collateral estoppel or the substantive law surrounding the issue.
237. Levasseur, 669 F. Supp. at 98 1.
238. Id. at 981 n.23. In United States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d 633 (1 lth Cir.
1992), the Eleventh Circuit criticized the Levasseur analysis by stating "that it
would create more problems than it was designed to solve." Id. at 635. It would
therefore completely defeat the doctrine's goals-judicial efficiency and economy. Id. See also Kennell, supra note 6 (reviewing the Levasseur criteria and
finding that it is over inclusive in some ways and under inclusive in others).
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. Id.at981.
242. In United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 1998),
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This test has one additional requirement: that the court perform an additional "fairness" examination even if the criteria are
satisfied.243 This "fairness" examination should be used by the
court to ensure that the doctrine is not only being applied in cases
involving illegal aliens. In this way, policy concerns about illegal
aliens will not usurp a defendant's right to a fair and just
VII. CONCLUSION
While continuing to address the threats of terrorism, courts
must decide how the United States should protect the civil liberties
of its citizens and non-citizens while securing them from the threat
of a terrorist attack. Part of this scrutiny involves the decision of
whether to allow offensive issue preclusion in criminal cases in
light of the potential to target its use in cases involving alien citizenship status. Currently, in the federal civil context, defensive
issue preclusion is almost always allowed, while offensive issue
preclusion is allowed on a case-by-case basis.245 In the federal
criminal context, a criminal defendant can always use defensive
issue preclusion against the government in the second action when
the defendant was acquitted in the first action.246The question becomes whether the government can use issue preclusion offensively to bar the criminal defendant from relitigating an issue that
was decided against the defendant in the first action.

the court found that a plea of guilty to illegal entry could not be used for collateral estoppel in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Id. at 1244. But see United
States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1980) (opining that a voluntary guilty plea constitutes an admission of all the facts alleged in the indictment
and therefore it is fair to estop the defendant from litigating one of those facts at
a subsequent criminal proceeding); Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d
20, 22 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding that defendant, by a voluntary plea, waived constitutional rights in a subsequent proceeding).
243. Levasseur, 699 F. Supp. at 981.
244. For a general discussion of some of the policy concerns involving
issues of status, see Daly, supra note 6; Tanya Kateri Hernandez, The Construction of Race and Class Buffers in the Structure of Immigration Controls and
Laws, 76 OR. L. REV. 731 (1997) (noting current anti-immigrant sentiment).
245. See supra note 56-57 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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The test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Parklane, which addressed the factors a court should look at in deciding
whether there should be offensive issue preclusion in civil cases, is
not sufficient to address the myriad of concerns that are present in
the criminal context. On balance, however, offensive issue preclusion in criminal cases is a useful tool that does not necessarily infringe on defendants' constitutional rights and can serve important
policy objectives of judicial economy and finality. Therefore, it is
important to create a new, more specific test that allows the government to use offensive preclusion against criminal defendants in
appropriate cases.
Immigration has influenced the face of the United States more
than any other cultural, political, or economic policy. If used
carefully and consistently by the courts, offensive issue preclusion
can prevent unnecessary litigation, discourage subsequent crimes,
and even prevent an influx of illegal aliens. As a country that is
committed to its heritage as a nation of immigrants and as a refuge
for those escaping oppression and seeking opportunity, we can be
equally committed to the fair and constitutional use of collateral
estoppel.
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